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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its 
ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
J. S. PRESTWICH, M.D. and LEATHA 
GRAFF PRESTWICH, his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
11263 
This is an action in eminent domain commenced by 
Appellant in December 1963, to condemn 50+ acres of the 
property of the Defendants, PRESTWICH, et ux., for the 
development and constructon of Interstate Freeway 1-15 in 
the area of Kanarraville, south Iron County, Utah. The 
Appellant appeals from the Judgment of Just Compensa-
tion entered on the jury verdict by District Judge C. Nelson 
Day on March 12, 1968. 
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DISPOSITION OF CASE IN TRIAL COURT 
Upon venue change to Beaver County, the case pra-
ceeded to tdal by jury on the issues of land value of the 
"taking" and damages to the remainder, the questions of 
the i·ight to condemn, public use and necessity and other 
jurisdictional requisites having been admitted in the Ap-
pellant's favor. 1 Both sides put on testimony as to fair 
market value and damages to the remainder, it being: 
For the Landowners : 
June S. Barron, Cedar City Appriaiser (R. 214, 232) 
Value of 50.07 acres taken ····---------------$ 8,608.60 
Damages to the remainder ---------------------- 33,428.40 
Total Opinion on Compensation ------------$42,037.00 
Marcellus Palmer, Sal1t Lake City Appraiser (R. 362, 
380) 
Value of 50.07 acres taken --------------------$ 9,106.90 
Damages to remainder ------------------------· ___ 29,839.50 
Total Opinion on Compensation ____________ $38,945.40 
For the State: 
Memory Cain, Salt Lake City Appraiser (R. 467, 
468,471,483,485) 
Value of 50.07 acres taken ____________________ $ 6,651.60 
Damages to remainder ------------------------·--- oo.oo --------Total Opinion on Compensation ------------$ 6,651.60 
1The pages in the case file of the Court Clerk, as transmitted to the 
Court on appeal, have not been numbered. Accordingly, the c.ase 
file will be cited and referred to generally when necessary. 
3 
W. Iverson, Washington County Rancher (R. 557, 
558, 576) 
Value of 50.07 acres taken --------$ No final opinion 
Damages to remainder ----·-------(admitted existence 
of severanee damages but could 
not calculate them) 
After four days of trial, the jury iieturned its verdict 
into open Court on March 7, 1968, as follows: 
1. Market Value of the 50.07 acres 
condemned --------------------------- -------------------· ---$ 7 ,850.50 
2. Damages to remainder ---------------------------- 26,67 4.'50 
3. Total verdict ------------------- ·--------------------------$34,525. 00 
The Appellant filed motions for new tria:l, N. 0. V. 
and elimination of ,all severance damages. (See case file.) 
All of said motions were, upon hearing, denied at the bench 
by Judge Day. The State appeals from the Judgment on 
the Verdict. ( See case file.) 
RELIEF SOUGHT BY APPELLANT ON APPEAL 
The State does not seek a reversal and new trial by its 
appeal herein. Rather, it requests that this Court reduce 
the Judgment of Just Compensation by striking or elimin-
ating therefrom "all severance damages" (App. Br. pp. 3-4, 
15). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's Statement of Facts is nearly incompre-
hem;ible, disjointed, substantially inaccurate, without rec-
4 
ord citation whatsoever, and replete with argument. Such 
Statement is not susceptible to response by Respondents in 
accordance with Rule 75(p) (2) U.R.C.P. Accordingly, Re-
spondents will make their own Statement of the record of 
trial: 
1. Total property BEFORE condemnation. 
(a) The subject property, before condemnation, 
was a cattle ranch of better than 1800± 
acres immediately west and north of Kanar-
raville (R. 47, 49-50). Situated in what was 
known as the north, south and center fields, 
the total farm had been developed as a bal-
anced ranching property, consisting of mea-
dow, irrigated and dry cultivated acreage 
and grazing land ( R. 70-79) . 
(b) Under the best use of the farm, substantial 
east-west, northeast-southwest, northwest-
southeast and converse movement was in-
volved (R. 82-83, 172-173, 198-200, 337, 341-
342) . There were no limi1tations in going to 
and from the various fields of the ranch 
prior to condemnation, access being provided 
by a typical north to south county farm-road 
through the bottom land (R. 73-75, 79-81. 
167-168). Beef cattle were fed-up and grazed 
throughout the ranch by continual rotation 
from field to field depending upon the grow-
ing season and weather (R. 78-81). Through 
this rotation of livestock and cropping, the 
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Respondents' livestock of several hundred 
head, were maintained the year around. 
(c) In 1956, the landowners filed with the State 
Engineer Application No. 28407 to drill a 
well and appropriate waJter up to 3 second 
feet for the irrigation of some 260 acres of 
land in the west section of the north field 
(Ex. 13, R. 56-59). After adjudication and 
other water hearings in the early 1960's, the 
Prestwich application was "designated for 
approval" by the State Engineer in August 
1963, four months before the date of con-
demnation herein ( R. 257) . Cal'led by Re-
spondents Ito testify, the State Engineer 
Hubert Lambert said that under the exper-
ienoe of the Engineer's office as of August 
1963, only 1 % of all water appHcations which 
had received "a designation for approval" by 
the State Engineer were thereafter disap-
proved (R. 262). And the Prestwich applica-
tion, itself, · was given formal approval by 
the Engineer in April 1964, without any 
further facts being considered other than 
those already known in August of 1963 when 
the application was "designated" for ap-
proval ( R. 265, Ex. 13) . Contrary to the 
claim of Appellant herein, the value wit-
nesses for the owners, in appraising the west 
land in the north field as of December 1963, 
did not evaluate the same as though the 
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water under Application No. 28407 were ac-
tually being applied to the land (R. 350). To 
the conrt:r~ary, the appraisals were premised 
on dry cultivated land with the probable po-
tential within the foreseeable future of irri-
gation water under the Appliication (R. 210-
212, 265, 350). Mr. Palmer in his appraisal, 
made it plain that the west land in the north 
field would have been substantially more val-
uable than as appraised by him, if the water 
under the Application had been actually on 
the land at the date of taking (R. 350) .2 
(d) In the eyes of the buyer and seller in the 
open market, the highest and best use of the 
Prestwich property, prior to condemnation, 
was as a cattle ranch (R. 195-200, 339-342). 
2. Taking by State for freeway. 
(a) On a north-south access, the non-iaccess free· 
way cut through the bottom meadow land 
and middle of the north and center fields 
and through the west of the south field (Ex. 
1). In all, 50.07 acres was condemned. 
(b) In the north field, 185 acres of potential irri-
gated crop land were left on the west of the 
300 foot wide freeway, permanently sepa· 
2The State has raised no issue in this Appeal relative to the ap-
praised value by the landowners' experts of the west land in th_e 
north field on the basis of its probable potential of irrigated, culti-
vated land. 
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rated from the balance of the north field of 
which it was formerly part and parcel (R. 
216, 375-376). No underpass or crossing was 
provided in the north field to get from one 
side of the freeway to the other (R. 28). 
( c) In the center field, 300 acres of crop land 
was left on the west of the freeway perma-
nently separwted from several hundred acres 
on the east of which it was formerly part 
and parcel (Ex. 1). Only an "arched" over-
pass serving a former east-west county road 
provided access to the 300 acres. 
( d) In the south field, the former access to the 
county farm-road on the wesit was perma-
nently blocked-off by the freeway. After 
condemnation, in order to get to the south 
field from the balance of the farm, the own-
ers were required to gio into the Town of 
Kanarraville (Ex. 1, R. 217). As admitted 
by Appellant,. an underpass and drainage 
box constructed in the south field by the 
State, had its entrance and exit on different 
property ownership and thus "made the box 
unusable as a livestock underpass" (App. 
Br. pp. 1-2). 
3. Damage to remaining property AFTER condemna-
tion. 
In addition to the foregoing, the evidence was that the 
following elements would be taken into account by the 
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buyer and seller in determining whether the remammg 
property west and east of the freeway had been diminished 
in value as a result of the taking and the construction of 
the freeway project: 
(a) Substantial disability in rotation and irriga· 
tion of remaining crop land in the north and 
center fields had been and would be exper-
ienced by the owners (R. 82-98, 216-220, 362· 
370) . Land formerly irrigated could no 
longer be watered as a conS€quence of the 
freeway alignment (R. 83-87, 217-218). 
(b) 'Jlo get from east to wesrt of the remaining 
property in the north field (formerly a dis· 
tance of about 40 feet) , the landowners, for 
example, werie now required to travel some 
3.5 miles down a frontage road, over the 
"arched" overpass, around a sharp curve and 
back up another frontage road to the other 
side. Such effort and its converse were and 
would be continually required in order to 
maintain minimum irrigation systems and 
crop rotation in the north field (R. 217, 96· 
97). 
(c) The ranch had been sliced up into arbitrary 
parcels east and west of the freeway. The 
latter acted as a barrier prohibiting all east-
west movement and rotation of property use, 
except at the "arched" overpass (R. 216-219, 
362-363) . The remaining severed parcels im-
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mediately east and west of the freeway could 
not be operated as economically and conven-
iently after condemnation as they we1~e op-
erated before condemnation as an integrated 
and unified field (R. 82, 366, 216). 
(d) Substantial disability was and would be en-
countered by the owners in the movement of 
cattle on the remaining property from one 
side of the freeway to the other (R. 96-97, 
218-219, 314, 370). Livestockmen and cat-
tlemen from throughout the state, including 
the chief farm appraiser of the State Road 
Commission, testified that the "arched" type 
of overpass will not work in a ranching set-
up inasmuch as beef cattle cannot be feasibly 
and practically driven over such an air struc-
ture. The owners have been and were forced 
to truck, for the first time, livestock from 
east to west and returning on the remaining 
property, 1a time-consuming and expensive 
burden in the operation of the land (R. 366). 
Other cattle ranches in the state of compara-
ble scope to the subject property, which had 
been similarly broken-up by a freeway, were 
analyzed (R. 371-372). It was found by the 
appraiser that the remaining severed lands 
adjacent to the freeway had sold on the open 
market for substantially less after condemna-
tion than the price for which they had been 
purchased before condemnation (R. 371-
10 
372). In the landowners case, no damage 
to the remaining property eas.t or west of 
the freeway, was predicated whatsoever on 
the sheer physical loss or shrinkage in the 
size of the total ranch by reason of the tak-
ing of the 50+ ac~es. 
4. The so-called replacement or cost of cure issue. 
The "cosit of securing replacement-substituted land" 
was never a legitimate good-fa:ith issue in the case. The 
State made no offer of proof to show that other lands were 
available in the immediate area which were comparable in 
quantity and quality to the property condemned and which 
would "cure" the damage otherwise caused by the sever-
ance and isolation of the remaining parcels so as to restore 
the remaining property and the landowners to their former 
economic position. But it now claims on Appeal that under 
the testimony of the Respondents' witnesses, two sales of 
80 acres each in May and June 1964 of land to the west of 
the freeway and north of the rema:ining west section of the 
Prestwich north field invokes the "replacement or cost of 
cure" rule in the case, so as to entitle the Appellant to a 
judgment eliminating all severance damage in the case 
(App. Br. pp. 6-8, 14) .3 So far as the replacement or cost 
acontrary to Appellant's claim, the record shows that these two sales 
(referred to as the Callewaert and Pie mes transactions), were in· 
troduced and received in evidence solely as severed tract transactions 
as a basis for proving the diminution in the value of the severed 
property of Prestwich to the west of the freeway. In other words. 
Callewaert and Piernes, were a reflection of what happens to the 
value of severed parcels which were left on the west of the freeway 
in the area of the Prestwich ground. 
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of cure is concerned, the Callewaert and Piernes property 
were already severed tracts lying to the west of the free-
way, infedor accesses partly landlocked, without water 
and with no water potential and rough uncultivated land 
(R. 229-231). 
The position of the Respondents on this spurious issue 
was consistent throughout the trial, viz., that the "replace-
ment or cost of cure" rule had no application in the trial 
since such lands even if available could not cure the dam-
ages mentioned in paragraphs 2 and 3 above and restore 
the landowners to the same comparable economic position 
as existed before the taking (R. 344). And further, as-
suming arguendo, the applicabiHty of the issue, the owner 
himself testified that as of the date of taking, December 
1963, he knew of no other comparable land available to him 
for sale in the area ( R. 104) . The State did not disprove 
the truth of such statement by any witness nor did it call 
its own witness to show that as of December 1963, any such 
lands were ava:ilable for sale to Prestwich. 
The trial Court, in discourse with counsel, indicated 
its awareness and judgment as to the inapplicability of the 
"replacement or cost of cure" rule in the case (R. 345-346). 
5. Appraisal testimony of landowners. 
Appellant's claim that the condemnees' appraisers did 
not evaluate the subject property Before and After the 
taking is a misrepresentation of the facts of trial. The 
record is clear that among other things, both Barron and 
Palmer gave their judgment as to : 
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(a) Fair market value of the subject property and 
each part thereof viewed under its highest and 
best use before condemnation (R. 197, 207-216 
' 340, 358-361, 375-378); 
(b) The fair market value of 1the 50.07 acres con-
demned, view in relationship to and as a piai~t of 
the larger ranch (R. 213-214, 359-362); 
(c) The fair market value of the remaining property 
after the expropriation and the construction of 
the freeway. Each testified that the "after val-
ue" of the remaining property was the same as 
that before the taking, except for specific areas 
proximately severed and affected by the freeway. 
As to the latter, damages to s1aid property were 
ascertained by determining the difference in its 
fair market value before and after the taking 
(R. 216-226, 362-363, 375-378). 
6. Appraisal testimony of Appellant. 
Memory Cain: The leading witness for the State, 
Cain had been a staff appraiser for the Road Commission 
until 1965. While he thereafter classified himself as a "fee 
appraiser" between 1965 and 1968, all of said appraisals 
(save two for Richard Dibblee) had been made for the 
Utah Attorney General or special counsel (R. 442, 492· 
493). His practice was to make appraisals of property 
which were already in condemnation and awaiting immedi· 
ate trial (R. 498). He had never appraised a single prop· 
erty in Utah or anywhere else for a rancher, farmer, or 
any agricultural property owner, either in or out of con· 
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demnation. When asked why he had l1eft the State employ-
ment thereafter to work continually for the State (or the 
Attorney General) on a non-employee basis, the witness 
answered "I can make better money this way" (R. 501). 
Cain made no inspection of the total property of these 
owners (R. 504-505, 506-507). He made no investigation 
as to the holdings in the ranch, water rights, past opera-
tion and rotation or the highest and best use of the wtaJl 
property. Cain appraised only the 50.07 acres condemned 
and a small landlocked parcel ( R. 506-513). And while he 
did not appraise the remaining property knowing not of 
what it comprised, he nonetheless concluded that 'it had 
sustained no damage (R. 509, 467, 468, 471, 483, 485). 
W. Iverson: A life-long resident and rancher in Wash-
ington County, Iverson had been requested by Appellant's 
counsel only a few days before trial to appraise the con-
demned 50.07 acres and no mor,e (R. 564). While Iverson 
had not been requested to detemine damages to the remain-
ing property, the witness opined on cross-examination that 
the remaining property of Prestwich was worth less "after" 
that it was "before" the taking, but he had not had time to 
determine how much the damage would total (R. 576). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE CASE WAS PROPERLY AND FULLY 
TRIED BY DISTRICT JUDGE DAY AND THE 
APPELLANT'S APPEAL LACKS ALL SUB-
STANCE. 
14 
Few condemnation appeals have ever been brought 
before this Oourt which possessed less merit than does 
this one. The issues raised herein lack both genuineness 
and originality - genuineness because the questions posed 
are nOlt actually raised in or supported by the evidence of 
trial - originality because the questions raised have al-
ready been firmly settled under the case precedent of this 
Court in which the Attorney General participated.4 
The case was tried as a typical partial-taking of a 
farm or ranch property under the same legal framework as 
numerous other agricultural condemnation suits, involving 
the Interstate Highway, in Utah. That framework is 78-
34-10 ( 1), (2) and (3), U.C.A. 1953, which Statute lays 
out the triable issues as : 
(1) The fair market value of the property con-
demned, together with improvements thereon as 
of the date of taking; 
( 2) "If the property sought to be condemned consti-
tutes only a part of a larger parcel, the damages 
which will accrue to the portion not sought to be 
condemned by reason of its severance * * * 
and the construction of the improvement * * *"; 
4Afthough indirect, yet in a very real sense, Appellant, under Points 
I, II and III of its Appeal, requests that this Court overrule and set 
aside the recent holdings in State Road Comm. v. Howes, 20 U. 2d 
246, 436 P. 2d 803 (1968), State Road Comm. v. Style Crete, Inc .. 20 
U. 2d 365, 438 P. 2d 537 (1968), and State Road Comm. v. Jacobs, 
16 U. 2d 167, 397 P. 2d 463 (1964). Such decisions would, of neces-
sity, have to be overturned in order to sustain Appellant's position 
herein. 
(3) 
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"If the property, though no piaflt .thereof is taken . ' 
will be damaged by the construction of the pro-
posed improvement, the amount of such dam-
ages." 78-34-10 U.C.A. 1953. 
The testimony of the landowners on the value of the ex-
propriation and damages to the remainder, the Verdict of 
the jury, and the Judgment entered thereon are eaoh and 
all within the letter and spirit of these sl:'ttutory issues. 
And the evidence of the landowners fully complied with the 
case rulings of this Court regarding proof and establish-
ment of land value and severance damage to remaining 
property. State Road Comm. v. Hansen, 14 U. 2d 305, 383 
P. 2d 917 ( 1963); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arthur, 10 U. 2d 
306, 352 P. 2d 693 (1960); State Road Comm. v. Peterson, 
12 U. 2d 317, 366 P. 2d 76 (1961); State Road Comm. v. 
Taggart, 19 U. 2d 247, 430 P. 2d 167 ( 1967). Moreover, 
the instructions of the Trial Judge (none of whiich is sub-
j ect of appeal herein) were in complete symmetry with the 
evidence wt .tri1ail, the statutory issues, and the decisional 
precedent with respect to value of the condemned land and 
damages to the severed and remaining property. 
The value witnesses for each side preS'ented a striking 
imbalance. For the Respondents - Palmer, whose services 
have been retained by practically every Governmental 
agency, Federal, State, and County in Utah (including hun-
dreds of assignments for the State Road Commission) (R. 
330-332) retained by small and large farmers and the 
major livestock outfits in the State (R. 328-329), and 
pro1Jably the most qualified agricultural appraiser in Utah, 
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gave testimony of documented case study of what happens 
to the market value of the remaining property of a ranch 
when a non-access freeway cuts it into fragmented parts 
with no provision for farm underpasses. - Barron, a con-
servatively oriented appraiser, long an employee of the 
Farmers Home Administration in Cedar City, had ap-
praised and was familiar with more real property in Iron 
County than any other witnesses. 
Against Palmer and Barron, the State called two wit-
nesses: - Cain never appraised or testified as an expert 
for anyone excepit the Attorney General. A "fee" appraiser 
on continual re1tainment from the Attorney General, he had 
never appraised property for any landowner in condemna-
tion. His testimony at trial, particularly on cross-exam-
ination, stands as an almost classic example of inconsis-
tency. - Iverson, a rancher from Washington County who 
acknowledged and admitted that there were severance dam-
ages to the remainder, was not able to calculate their 
amount because he had not been requested to and wasn't 
given the time to appraise such damages. 
The rather complete lack of credibility in the State's 
evidence underscored the brute facts of the case - that 
the Hoad Commission had constructed a non-access freeway 
for more than three miles through the center of one of the 
largest irrigated ranches in Iron County, severing some 
485 acres on the west from the balance of the farm with 
no means of crossing provided for the owner to get to and 
from the remainder lands. Only an "arched" overpass near 
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the center field prevented the entire property on the west 
from being landlocked and such structure could not be 
practically used for driving beef cattle. Along with the 3.5 
mile trips to reach the west or the north field (formerly a 
distance of only 40 feet), these were some of the problems 
which confronted the buyer and seller in purchasing the 
remainder property after condemnation. 
The issues of land value and severance damages were 
questions of fact for the jury whose decision this Court i1s 
loathe to disturb. Weber Basin Conservancy Dist. v. N el-
son, 11 U. 2d 253, 358 P. 2d 81 (1960); State Road Comm. 
V. Stanger, 21 U. 2d 185, 442 P. 2d 941 (1968). 
The jury verdict on severance damage is, in whole, 
supported by the substantial evidence as above indicated. 
Such vierdict; is not to be set aside on this appeal in what 
amounts to a "rehash" of law questions previously decided 
by this Court. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED 
UNDER THE RULING PRECEDENT THAT 
THE LANDOWNER HAD, INDEED, MET 
THEIR BURDEN OF PROVING SEVERANCE 
DAMAGES TO THE REMAINDER PROPERTY. 
The issues raised by Appellant are the subject of quick 
resolution once the testimony and rulings of the Trial Court 
are known. The State, in Point I of its Brief, seems to 
claim that the owners were not entitled to the recovery orf 
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severance damages to the remainding property because, to 
us their words: "In no place did the Defendants make any 
offer whatsoever of any proof :to show that they were en-
titled to severance damage". (App. Br. p. 5). As alleged 
support for such statement, Appellant cites and quotes 
from State Road Comm. v. Howes, 20 U. 2d 246, 436 P. 2d 
803 (1968) .5 Appellant then proceeds in the next breath 
to allege the reason why the owners did not meet their bur-
den of proof on damages, to-wit, because it is claimed there 
was other available land in the area to "rep'lace" the 50.07 
acres condemned. Thus, it is contended that since the con-
demnees did not make proper proof on such point, all sever-
ance damages awarded as merged in the Judgment should 
be totally stricken. The response to this esoteric claim is 
not complex. To begin with, it was acknowledged at trial 
and is admitted here that the owner, in eminerut domain, 
must go forward with evidence and proof on the issues of 
land value within the taking and damages to the severed 
and remainder p1"'0perty. Such principle, however, was 
,apart of the ruling law in this jurisdiction long before the 
dicta in Howes. A series of decisions have so held.6 
Simply put then, the question is what factors need the 
owner prove in his case to make a prima f acre showing of 
5The citation from Howes in Appellant's Brief, p. 5, is a misquote of 
Justice Callister's opinion. The quoted sentence is not, in fact, com-
plete and self-contained as made to appear, but rather is part of a 
la:::ger sentence and statement. 
soregon Shortline R. Co. v. Russell, et al., 27 Utah 457, 76 Pac. 345 
(1904); Tanner v. Provo Bench Canal and Irrigation Co., 40 Utah 
105, 121 Pac. 584 (1911); State Road Comm. v. Peterson, 12 U. 2d 
317. 366 P. 2d 76 (1961). 
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entitlement to severance damages ?7 The answer is thrut the 
burden of going forward on the rissue of severance damages 
is made by: 
( 1) factual proof that the property condemned is but 
part of a larger remaining property, contiguous 
or non-contiguous, having the same highest and 
best use and unity of ownership; 4 Nichols on 
Eminent Domm:n, 494, §14.1 et seq.; 
(2) expert or landowner opinion that, by reason of 
the "taking" and construction of the freeway as 
proposed, the rema!ining property or particular 
parts, have been diminished in the former mar-
ket value. In making such proof, the "before 
and after" rule is applicable. State Road Comm. 
v. Peterson, 12 U. 2d 317, 366 P. 2d 76 (1961); 
State Road Comm. v. Ward, 112 Utah 452, 189 
P. 2d 113 (rn48). 4 Nichols on Eminent Do-
main, 511 §14.21.8 
That 7 8-34-10 ( 2) and ( 3) and the decisions of this 
Court (if not the constitutional mandate of Art. I §22), 
71ndeed, what factors does the owner need to prove to show market 
value of the land within the actual taking? The cases are legion that 
expert testimony on fair market value, or even the testimony of the 
owner himself, is quite sufficient to sustain the burden of proof and 
award. Southern Pacific Co. v. A.rthur, supra; Provo River Water 
Users Assoc. v. Carlson, 103 Utah 93, Ul3 P. 2d 777 (1943); State 
Roud Comm. v. Woolley, 15 U. 2d 248, 390 P. 2d 860 (1964). 
9And of course, damage to remainder property must be special to the 
particular property involved, i.e., damage that is directly attributable 
to the highway project and the taking. 4 Nichols on Em. Dom. 
475 §14.1. No objection or question on this factor was at all raised 
in the trial. 
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contemplate and require no more and no less than these 
factors, is elementary and beyond reasonable debate. The 
landowners herein made precisely this proof at trial. In 
detail, testimony was given as to the total ranch, its best 
use in operation, waiter rights, and different types of prop-
erty. The condemned property was identified in its rela-
tionship to and as a part of a larger ranch. And the value 
witnesses for the Respondents testified without equivoca-
tion with respect to the remainder property, its value be· 
fore and after condemnation, and as to the remainder 
property directly affected. by the taking, the before and 
after values of the same. 
What other conditions or factors need be proven by 
the landowners under its burden of proof? The Appellant 
does not say or specify in its Brief, save possibly one -
namely, the purchase of so-called replacement land to cure 
the severance damage. 
1. "Replacement or Cost-to-Cure" rule is totally inap· 
plicable. 
The gist of what Appellant's counsel says in his Point 
I, is tied up in the "replacement or cost-to-cure" rule of 
severance damages. Although the State made no offer of 
proof as to the availability in December 1963, of any re· 
placement property in the area which would cure the sever· 
ance injuries outlined in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this State-
ment of Facts, it is nevertheless contended. that somehow 
under the authority of the Howes decision, the owner had 
the burden of showing the unavailability of such land as a 
condition to the recovery of severance damages. And fur 
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ther, it is argued that if there were other land available for 
purchase, these owners had an obligation to make such 
purchase out of pocket in order to mitigate damages. 
Appellant should re-examine the decision in State 
Road Comm. v. Howes, supra, for the ruling which evolve.I 
in that case is the precise antithesis of that which State 
counsel claims for it herein. For in Howes, this Court 
writing through Justice Callister, flatly held that the con-
demnee is not required, as a condition to the proof and re-
covery of severance damages, to show the unavailability of 
other property in the area: 
"We hold that in a condemnation action it is 
the condemnee's burden to prove severance damage, 
but that before doing so he does not generally have 
the burden of first showing that such damage, if 
any, could not be minimizeJ or mitigated." 436 P. 
2d at 804. 
By Point I of its Brief, Appellant reargues the same 
point which the Appellant argued in HouJes and lost. But 
even apart from the question of whose burden it is to raise 
the "replacement" issue, it is a fair statement that with 
respect to the merits of this particular principle of dam-
age:,, no one who has reasonably read and understood the 
decisions of this Court9 on this point and thus, the presently 
developed stwte •of law, could seriously urge its application 
in the case at Bar. 
9See the discussion in State Road Comm. v. Howes, supra, and the 
late,;t opinion of State Road Comm. v. Style Crete, Inc., 20 U. 2d 365, 
438 P. 2d 537 (1968). both of which directly deal with the "replace-
ment" principle, and the application of the Carlsen and Co-op Se-
Clirit1· holdings in a severance damage case. 
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It is crystal clear and beyond argument that ,the dam. 
age to the remainder property west and east of the freeway 
as described in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Statement of 
Facts herein could not conceivably be cured by purchasing 
other properties in the area (even assuming, arguendo, 
that other property was available). Under the holding of 
this Court in the Howes and Style Crete decisions, the "re-
placement or cost-of-cure" rule is only relevant and admis-
sible on the question of severance damages when : 
(a) substantially comparable property in quality and 
quantity, is known to be available rto the con· 
demnee for sale as of the date of taking; and 
(b) such property purchase, if substituted for and in 
place of the property actually condemned, will 
cure the severance damages otherwise caused so 
that the owner is in the same "relwtive position 
as before the taking". State v. Style Crete, Inc., 
supra. 
The claim of Appellant, thus viewed in the light of 
Howes and Style Crete,1° is spurious. Such claim, in sub· 
stance, is that because two 80 acre pieces (on the west side 
of the freeway) to the north and west of the remaining 
ranch sold five to six months after the date of taking, the 
law requires, in determining severance damages, that these 
owners purchase the same in mitigation. In fact, the land 
was not comparable in either quantity ( 160 acres to 50.07 
10 Appellant has failed to refer to the Style Crete holding, although it 
was substantially referred to and discussed on the motion for new 
trial before Judge Day. 
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acres) or quality (rough uncultivated acreage as against 
cultivated and meadow land condemned). But just as im-
portant, the purchase of said additional tracts by these 
owners would not have at all cured the severance damage 
or ri'.stored the owners to their former position as required 
by Howes and Style Crete. Indeed, such purchase would 
have amplified and enlarged the severance damage because 
there iuould have been rnore severed property on the west 
of thP freeway. And so it was, that Judge Day was not in 
error when after substantial discussion with counsel and 
consideration of the State's theory as it related to Howes 
(and later Style Crete), he ruled that the "replacement" 
rule had no relevancy in the trial. 
The Iast part of Appellant's argument (page 8 of its 
Brief) , that the owners must purchase the claimed replace-
ment prope1'ty at their own expense to mitigate severance 
damages, is equally spurious. The Co-op Security and Carl-
sen cases, as discussed in Style Crete and Howes, do not say 
any such thing, and this Court has never intimated that 
sueh a bizarre result might be in store for a landowner in 
a p<>.rtial-taking case. Ca1·lsen and Co-op Security hold that 
if and when the "relacement" rule is applicable, se'verance 
damages are to be measured by the cost of acquiring the 
comparable substitute property and that cost is to be as-
sessed and awarded as part of the Judgment of Just Com-
pe11sation. Yet Appellant in Point I asks the Court to strike 
from the Judgment all severance damages. Even under 
theil' erroneous theory, as warped as it is, substantial dam-
ages would be owing to the landowners. 
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In all, Point I of Appellant's Appeal illustrates a lack 
of appreciation of the "replacement or cost-to-cure" rule 
and its relationship to the severance damage concept in 
eminent domain. The trial court did nat err and it should 
be affirmed. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED 
THAT THE EXPERT WITNESSES FOR THE 
LANDOWNER DID APPRAISE THE SUBJECT 
PROPERTY AND SEVERANCE DAMAGES IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW. 
Appellant claims in Point II of its Brief that the trial 
Court erred in determining that the expert witnesses for 
the landowners, in determining severance damages or the 
difference between the damaged property before and after 
condemnation, improperly evaluated such damage under the 
law. The reason given for the claim is that the DefendanUi 
"having elected" to consider the ranch as an "economic 
unit", were required to appraise the total ranch before 
and after condemnation. The argument is a paradox and 
again, stems from the failure to recognize the law issues 
before the Court in a severance damage case and the in-fact 
evidence received. Appellant's argument is without merit. 
Contrary to Appellant's lament, there is nothing at all 
magic about the conclusion, made by the experts, that the 
ranch, before condemnation, constituted a total ranch unit. 
Such result is merely a part of the general investigatory 
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and conclusion process of the appraiser which is necessar-
ily involved in every partial-taking case. McMichael's Ap-
praising Manuel, Appraising for Condemnation, p. 456 (5th 
Ed.). As to the admissibility of evidence with respect to 
severance damage, the appraiser must, indeed, investigate 
the larger property, a part of which is condemned, as a 
condition to testimony on damages to the remainder caused 
by the severance and highway consrtruotion under 78-34-
10 ( 2) and (3) U.C.A. 1953. Elsewise, the expert would be 
in no position to conclude that the condemned property was 
but part of a larger tract of land with unity of use and 
ownership. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548, 42 L. Ed. 270, 
17 S. Ct. 966; 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain 511 §14.21. 
In all events, the record herein reflects fully that the 
landowners' experts, Palmer and Barron, did just that 
which Appellant claims should have been done - they did 
appraise the entire ranch before the taking; they did evalu-
ate the fair market value of the 50.07 acres condemned, 
viewed as part of the larger property; they did evaluate the 
remaining property after condemnation and they did de-
termine damages to said remainder by determining in their 
juJgment, the difference in the fair market value of the 
said property before and after condemnation. The record 
could not be clearer on this point and Appellant's attempt 
to distort or portray the testimony otherwise as it claims in 
its Brief is unworthy of the Appellant. 
The testimony before the Court wholly parallelled the 
approach to value pursued by the witnesses in State Road 
Comm. v. Peterson, 12 U. 2d 317, 366 P. 2d 76 ( 1961) (a 
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ranching operation) and thus is in harmony wi'th the pro-
nouncement of this Court in tha;t case : 
"As to the error assigned in instructing on 
damages: notwithstanding the zealous efforts of 
counsel to torture them, we think they were such 
that the jury understood and applied the correct 
measure of damages : for the land actually :taken: 
the fair cash mark!et value on the date of condemna-
tion; and for severance damages to the remainder: 
the difference between its fair cash market value 
before and after the taking." 
There was no error. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RECEIVED 
EVIDENCE OF THE PROBABLE POTENTIAL 
OF THE WELL APPLICATION NO. 28407 AS 
THE SAME RELATED TO THE VALUE OF 
THE WEST SECTION OF THE NORTH FIELD 
BEFORE CONDEMNATION. 
Lastly, Appellant argues that Judge Day erred in al-
lowing the experts for the owners to speculate on the ap-
proval of well Application No. 28407 in determining the 
value of the condemnej property before condemnation. In 
so arguing, Appellant does not suggest how such testimony 
was prejudicial to the result in the case, a responsibility 
which it clearly has to this Court. Lemmon v. D. & R. G. 
W.R. R. Co., 9 U. 2d 195, 341P.2d 215 (1959). And the 
relief which the Appellant requests in this appeal has no 
relationship, in fact or law, to the question raised in Point 
III of its Brief. 
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Nevertheless, the short response to this claim is that 
the testimony of the Defendants on the water Application 
was not speculative in law. The evidence shows beyond 
dispute that the State Engineer had "designated" the Ap-
plication (on file since 1956) for approval four months 
prior to the date of taking herein, and rthe State Engineer, 
himself, testified that the Engineer typically gives formal 
approval to 95% of those applicaitions as to which "ap-
proval designation" is given. Testimony was also given as 
to the general water geology of the area and the probability 
of water on drilling. But the important part of this testi-
mony was that the value of the land under the Application 
was not appraised as though the water from the well was in 
fact, being pumped and applied. Rather, the property was 
appraised as it was found in the market as of the date of 
taking with the probable potential in the foreseeable future 
of water being available via the application. Such testimony 
and evidence fully accords with the "rule of probability" in 
eminent domain as recognized by this Court throughout the 
decisions. State Road Comm. v. Jacobs, supra; Tanner v. 
Provo Bench and Canal Co., supra; State Road Comm. v. 
Estate of Ida Holt, 14 U. 2d 235, 381 P. 2d 724 (1963). 
Whether such evidence, once admitted, was credible and to 
be believed was a question of fact solely for the jury and 
its determination will not be overturned. 
CONCLUSION 
The appeal by the State herein is a complete non-
sequitur. It asks that the Court recognize the Judgment of 
Just Compensation as valid so far as value of the con-
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·demned land is concerned, but declare the same Judgment 
invalid wilth respect to severance damag,es. Such request 
legally is an impossible accomplishment since there is but 
one judgment in which is merged all factors of Just Com-
pensation as by law defined in 78-34-10 U.C.A. 1953. The 
integrated judgment is either good or it isn't and a party 
may not appeal piecemeal issues which have been merged 
in the final judgment. 78-34-16 U.C.A. 1953; Rule 72 (a) 
U.R.C.P.; Thomson v. Thomson, 5 Uta:h 401 (1888); 4 Am. 
Jur. 2d 571, App. 1and Err. §49; 4 C.J.S. 297, App. and Err. 
§lOH. 
In asking not for a new trial but the elimination of 
severance damages from the Judgment, Appellant's appeal 
is f~ven more of a paradox. For under its "replacement" 
theory, as erroneous as its is, there would have to be reoog-
nized substantial severance damages in accordance with the 
controlling case law and due process. (See Point II para-
grap (1) herein). 
This case was properly and typically tried by District 
Judge Day. A verdict, after four days of trial, was re-
turned fully ,supported by the believable evidence. The ap-
peal herein is without legal significance under the already 
established precedent, and this Court should affirm the 
Judgment of the trial Court, we do respectfully submit. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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